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Chapter 6
A Process for Generating Concrete
Architectures
Mathieu Boussard, Stefan Meissner, Andreas Nettstra¨ter, Alexis Olivereau,
Alexander Salinas Segura, Matthias Thoma, and Joachim W. Walewski
This chapter addresses the question of how to generate concrete architectures with
the IoT ARM, which is one of the many uses to which an architectural reference
model can be put (see Chaps. 3 and 4). This topic was already touched upon in
Section “Generation of Architectures” in Chap. 3, but it is covered in greater depth
in this section.
Note that we do not prescribe any specific architecting methodology for
generating concrete architectures. Instead, this section outlines how and where
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during the architecting process the IoT ARM can provide help and input for the
architect. We return to this topic of “methodology agnosticism” in Sect. 6.2.
As can be seen in Chap.3 Figure “Process for the generation of concrete
architectures”, the IoT ARM informs the engineering strategies for the design of
a concrete IoT system, and the transformation rules are derived from the entirety of
the IoT ARM. Also, the IoT ARM informs the requirement-generation process. In
this section we are focusing in greater detail on the generation of requirements and
on the transformation of these requirements into a concrete architecture. Notice that
a concrete architecture implies that it meets a selected use case and application
scenario.
6.1 Process Steps to Generate IoT Architectures
What are the main building blocks of a domain-specific architecture that adheres to
the IoT ARM framework? The answer is: architectural views. As discussed at the
beginning of Chap. 7 and Sect. 8.1 “Short Definition of Views and Perspectives” in
Chap. 8, we chose to arrange a system architecture according to views, with the
totality of all views constituting the architecture description. Figure 6.1 outlines
how the views are related to each other and how they contribute to the system
design. All views shaded yellow are covered in detail in the IoT Reference
Architecture (see Chap. 8) or in this Section. These views are:
• Physical Entity view
• Deployment view
• Operational view
• IoT Context view




• In dark red: views that are treated in Chap. 8 and in Carrez et al. (2013) or in this
section;
• In orange: related models (see Chap. 7).
Note that since the IoT Domain Model also encompasses the role of users, it
actually implicitly covers the enterprise view as advocated by RM-ODP (Raymond
1995) (see Chap. 3 for a discussion of the enterprise view and Sect. 7.3 for a
discussion of roles in the IoT Domain Model). Note also that although the other
views shown in Fig. 6.1 (“. . . view”) are not covered in the IoT ARM, this does not
imply that they are not important for generating concrete architectures. This
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becomes clearer when we look at the architecture generation process in more detail.
Figure 6.2 outlines the activities involved in generating an architecture. These are:
• Create Physical Entity view
• Create IoT Context view
• Requirements process
• Derive other views





Derive other viewsBusiness goals
Requirement process
Fig. 6.2 UML activity diagram of the IoT architecture generation process (generation of
requirements and transformation of requirements into a concrete architecture)
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In this figure, dashed arrows represent dependency, while solid arrows represent
control flow (can be understood as either the next step or expressing a logical
contingency of the target on the source).
As you can see, the creation of the Physical Entity View and IoT Context View
(see Fig. 6.1) are explicit activities in the architecting process. All other views are
comprised in the activity “derive other views”. Before we look at each of these
activities in more depth, let us return to the question of architecture methodologies
and how the IoT ARM relates to them.
6.2 Compatibility with Other Architecting Methodologies
Figure 6.2 could give rise to the impression that we prescribe a sequential approach
for generating architectures: (1) Define the scope, i.e. the business goals; (2) Create
the Physical Entity View and the IoT Context View; (3) Define requirements; and
(4) Generate the remaining views. This type of sequential approach to architecting
lies, for instance, at the heart of the waterfall approach (Royce 1970). This inter-
pretation of Fig. 6.2 is indeed true if all arrows in Fig. 6.2 are understood as arrows
in time. However, they can also be understood as logical dependencies. For
instance, in order to conduct the requirements process, we need a set of formulated
business goals, an IoT Context View and a Physical Entity View. If we interpret the
process described in this Section in the latter way, it can be mapped onto a plethora
of popular architecting methodologies, such as Model-Driven Engineering (MDE)
(Miller and Mukerji 2003), Pattern-Based Design (Gamma et al. 1994), and the
Spiral Model (Boehm 1988).
The only limitation we see is in the choice of views. Some architectural
methodologies prescribe different sets of views. Some of them, for instance the 4
+1 approach, lack some of the views we prescribe (mainly the information and
context views) (Kruchten 1995). In this case we could choose to embed the 4+1
framework into the process described in this Section. On the other hand, other
methodologies comprise views that are not part of the IoT ARM set. In this case, the
option is to integrate the IoT ARM views (and the manner in which they are
derived) into this other methodology.
6.3 IoT Architecture Generation and Related Activities
Since neither the IoT Context View nor the Physical Entity View are addressed in
the IoT Reference Architecture (see Chap. 8), and since they are integral parts of the
architecting process (Fig. 6.2), we need to look more closely at both of these views
and understand how they inform the architecting process.
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6.3.1 Physical Entity View
Before we describe the Physical Entity View we need to discuss what it is not:
i.e. the “traditional” physical view in system architecting – a well-established view
in software system architectures (see, for instance, Kruchten 1995). “It is concerned
with the topology of software components on the physical layer, as well as the
physical connections between these components. This view is also known as the
deployment view.” (Wikipedia 2013a; 4+1 view). As Fig. 6.1 implies, we are not
using the term physical view for the deployment view in order to avoid semantic
tension with the Physical Entity View.
The Physical Entity View does of course refer to the Physical Entity in the IoT
Domain Model (see Sects. 7.3.2 and 9.1). The Physical Entity is “any physical
object that is relevant from a user or application perspective” (Appendix). For a
concrete use case and application scenario, this is of course a well-defined set of
physical objects. For instance, in the recurring example (see Sect. 4.2), the Physical
Entities are the orchids that are transported in a truck and these orchids are subject
to environmental monitoring.
It is obvious for many reasons why the architecture of an IoT system also needs
to include a Physical Entity View. Firstly, the dimensions, the distribution and the
properties of the Physical Entities have various implications. Examples of these
implications are:
• Devices: the sensors/actuators needed and where are they situated; their
relationship to the Physical Entity (directly mounted; touching; remote but in
sight . . .), etc. Note that the device choice is influenced by the Physical Entity. In
the recurring example, it is too expensive (in relation to the market price of the
Physical Entity) to measure the temperature of each orchid. Instead, sensors that
measure the air temperature are situated inside the cargo area. It is then assumed
that the air temperature equals that of the orchids. In other words, the Physical
Entity model also needs to include a sensing and/or an actuating model.
• Information view: what physical quantities are monitored by the sensors; how
are the quantities related to each other, etc.? In the recurring example the
quantity that is handled by the system is the air temperature in the cargo area
of the truck.
Secondly, in some use cases, the devices might be incorporated inside the
Physical Entity, which can have a range of implications for the IoT system. For
instance, if sensors are deployed inside a human body and the wireless sensor signal
is to be relayed to an outside reader, we need to understand the in-body propagation
characteristics of this signal. It may be the case that the strong attenuation caused by
the body tissue calls for a scenario in which signal repeaters are deployed. This has
implications for the communication aspect of the architecture (! functional view).
Thirdly, the type of the Physical Entity – in combination with the application
scenario – can have implications for the Trust, Security, and Privacy Perspective
(see Sect. 8.2.3). Let us look again at the recurring example. Since orchids can be
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very expensive, and since this can increase the likelihood of the truck being raided
while, for instance, parked during a coffee break or overnight, it is paramount that
the wireless signal emanated by the orchid monitoring system cannot be identified
as such nor be deciphered. If this were to happen, it could, for instance, inform a
burglar how many orchids are in the shipment.
Although the Physical Entity View is obviously very central to the IoT ARM, it
is not covered in the IoT Reference Architecture. This apparent contradiction is
attributed to the overwhelming range of Physical Entities in the IoT: they can range
from the nano- and micrometre scale to truly macroscopic dimensions (e.g. glacier
monitoring); they can be gaseous or liquid; they can be animate or inanimate or a
mixture of both; they can be stationary or mobile. “Mobile” can include walking,
running, moving on wheels, flying, coasting under water, flying through interplan-
etary space, and so on. Also, there is no ONE physical quantity to be monitored – in
one use case it can be the temperature of orchids, in another the occupancy of a
room (automated light switch), in another case blood sugar levels. This overwhelm-
ing range of Physical Entities provides for the generation of generic yet compre-
hensive viewpoints and thus models for the Physical Entity View. This lack of
“least common denominator” is the reason why it was not possible to devise
Physical Entity models at the reference architecture level and thus integrate them
into the IoT ARM.
The user of the IoT ARM is advised to use his own domain understanding to
devise the Physical Entity view. Where required, pertinent models (for instance,
freshness vs. room temperature model for orchids) either need to be developed by
the architecture team or they can be extracted from outside sources (literature,
standards, etc.).
6.3.2 IoT Context View
As indicated in Fig. 6.1, the IoT Context View consists of two parts: the context
view and the IoT Domain Model. The context view is an architecture view that is
generated at the very beginning of the architecture process. It describes “the
relationships, dependencies, and interactions between the system and its environ-
ment (the people, systems, and external entities with which it interacts)” (Rozanski
andWoods 2011). To be more specific, the context view describes “what the system
does and does not do; where the boundaries are between it and the outside world;
and how the system interacts with other systems, organizations, and people across
these boundaries” (Rozanski 2013). The concerns addressed by the context view are
(Rozanski 2013):
• “System scope and responsibilities
• Identity of external entities and services and data used
• Nature and characteristics of external entities
• Identity and responsibilities of external interfaces
50 M. Boussard et al.
• Nature and characteristics of external interfaces
• Other external interdependencies
• Impact of the system on its environment
• Overall completeness, consistency and coherence”
Note that at least one of the concerns, i.e. “impact of the system on its environ-
ment” also applies to the Physical Entity, and investigating this concern thus
requires input from the Physical Entity View (see Fig. 6.2).
A detailed example of a context view, including a context diagram and a
description of the system components, can be found in Chap. 11.
Note that the context view focuses mainly on what lies outside the system and
how the system interfaces to the outside world. This is sufficient for “generic”
architecting processes, but for the IoT domain, not only do we know more about the
system to be devised, we should actually also gather more information about the
system at a very early stage in the architecting process. Why? Firstly, since IoT
systems have many aspects in common by virtue of operation in the same domain, a
lot of concepts are recurring concepts. One of the goals of the IoT ARM is to avoid
“reinventing the wheel”, namely to avoid discovering, analysing and naming the
very same aspects every time an architecture is generated. In order to permeate the
entire architecture description with this understanding, we prescribe its use early on
in the architecting process. This has advantages not only for the architecture
generation itself, but also for other usages, such as architecture reuse. If common
concepts, semantics, structures and relationships are fused into the core of an
architecture description, this makes it much easier to reuse aspects of the architec-
ture description or even the entire architecture. This can, for instance, be interesting
for architecture development within a technology roadmap. Also, trust, security,
privacy and safety are contingent upon system borders and thus on the
functionalities and hardware that reside inside and outside the system border. The
IoT Domain Model readily comprises both the “inside” and the “outside” of a
system, and thus provides a deeper insight into relationships between the system
entities and also interactions with the “outside world”. For all of these reasons, it is
beneficial to conduct a domain model analysis before embarking on actions such as
threat analysis and requirements engineering.
So what other reasons are there for expanding the context view “inward”,
namely also covering the system itself? Why not just add a view to the architecting,
namely the IoT Domain View, to the architecture description? The main reason is
that both models are complementary and need to be applied early on in the
architecting process. This is why we chose to pair the two system views. Note
that the context in the IoT Context View has an extended meaning to that in the
“traditional” context view, where it alludes to the context in which the system finds
itself in relation to its surroundings. The IoT Context View expands on this by also
including the entities within the system and by setting each of these entities in
relation – context! – to the other entities.
The IoT Domain Model, on the other hand, provides a semantic and ontological
overlay for the context view in that it provides guidance on which entities make up
an IoT system and how they relate to each other. It also helps to identify system
boundaries, which is one of the main questions to be addressed in the context view.
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For more information on the IoT Domain Model see Sect. 7.3, and for guidance on
how to generate a concrete IoT Domain Model see Sect. 9.1.
Note, that since all are listed and characterised in the IoT Context View, this is
also the natural place for where to address the roles of all entities. These roles can
for instance, be categorised as permissions, prohibitions, and obligations. For more
information on these categories the reader is referred to elsewhere in the literature
(Raymond 1995). For a discussion of how these roles figure into the system
composition see Sect. 7.5.2.1).
An exhaustive discussion of the context view is available in literature (Woods
and Nick 2008), but in order to enable immediate usability of the IoT ARM, we
provide a short summary below.
6.4 Requirements Process and “Other Views”
6.4.1 Requirements Process
So far, we have shed light on two of the views that constitute an IoT architecture:
Physical Entity View and the IoT Context View. Now we will discuss the remaining
mandatory activities for generating an architecture: the requirements process and
the derivation of “other views” (see Fig. 6.2). Figure 6.3 illustrates the architecture
activities in more detail. How exactly the IoT ARM contributes to each of these
actions is covered in the next Section.
As indicated in Fig. 6.1 and discussed in the previous Section, the context view is
expanded by the IoT Domain Model. Therefore, both the generation of the “tradi-
tional” context view (see Sect. 4.1) and the expansion of this view in the IoT
Domain Model are included in the creation of an IoT context view. As also
explained in Sect. 6.4.1, the Physical Entity View provides input for the generation
of the IoT context view.
With the input from the Physical Entity View and the IoT Context View, we can
conduct a threat analysis. This type of analysis identifies potential weaknesses of
the system use case envisaged, and it also identifies design choices and in some
cases even functionalities that mitigate the risks identified. This analysis also
provides guidance for the requirements engineering action (the security risks that
need to be addressed by requirements).
The requirements process consists of many intermediate steps. The requirements
engineering action generates a list of references that belong to one of three types:
view requirements (i.e. requirements that directly inform one of the architectural
views), qualitative requirements and design constraints. Note that we categorise the
Unified Requirements (see online at http://www.iot-a.eu/public/requirements)
along different dimensions (functional requirement, non-functional requirement,
. . .) in order to increase the usability of UNIs for users who are not familiar with the
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IoT ARM taxonomy of requirements. The translation of the UNI requirement types
into IoT ARM process types is described Sect. 6.7.
In the prevailing approaches toward translating qualitative requirements into
view-related requirements, we usually rely on a set of view requirements that is
already available. An example of this type of approach is Quality-Function Deploy-
ment (Erder and Pureur 2003), which, amongst other things, is a central part of the
ISO 9000 standards suite (ISO 2009). The assumption of an existing set of view
requirements is a reasonable one for straight-forward product extensions or the
design of simple systems, but for most IoT systems, this type of approach is not
feasible. In other words, qualitative requirements cannot be translated directly into
view requirements. In typical IoT systems, not only is complexity high, but there is
often a plethora of options for achieving the desired performance of the system to be
built. In other words, there are many sets of view requirements that meet the same
set of qualitative requirements.
In order to overcome this design roadblock, we devised a step-by-step process
through which view requirements can be inferred from qualitative requirements.
The first step is to formulate the rationale of the qualitative requirements as business
principles. For a detailed discussion of business principles, see (Rozanski and
Woods 2011). This step is followed by identification of concerns and related
activities. This action includes identifying each of the qualitative requirements
with one or more architectural perspectives. The next step is to choose design
tactics and then make design choices (covered in more detail in Sect. 6.4.1.8).
If the requirement is a design constraint, then it directly informs the design
choice action.
From the design choices made, it is then possible to formulate implications for
the functional view and other views (see Sect. 6.4.1.8).
Fig. 6.3 IoT architecture generation (expansion of Fig. 6.2)
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If the requirement is of the view type, it can later be mapped directly onto the
architecture description. We have found it very helpful to initially map functional
view requirements onto the functional decomposition (see Sect. 8.1) throughout
the requirements process. This makes it easier to track what parts of the system
architecture are already covered by the requirements and whether more
requirements are needed.
Salient inputs to the requirements process come, of course, from the Physical
Entity View. This view, among others, provides the requirement engineer with
information about special features of the “things” and the device-thing relationship
(see Sect. 6.4). Another important source of information is the IoT Context View.
It not only provides an overview of the system envisaged, but, thanks to the IoT
Domain Model, it also provides the requirement engineer with information about
the entities that are part of the system, what they are called, and how they relate to
and interact with each other.
6.4.2 View Derivation
The remaining views are addressed in the activity “Derive other views”. As shown
in Fig. 6.3, this activity consists at least of the derivation of the functional view, the
information view, the operational view and the deployment view. Where needed,
other views can be addressed. Examples of such views are the concurrency view,
the enterprise view and the engineering view (Wikipedia 2013b; view model). As
indicated in Fig. 6.3, this activity is contingent on the requirements process and it is
also guided by the Physical Entity View and the IoT Context View. For instance,
the IoT Context View might indicate that, due to the different ownership of parts of
the system, a communication firewall is needed (! functional view). In another
example, the Physical Entity View might indicate that, due to the fragility of
the Physical Entity, all devices attached need to be installed all at once
(! deployment view).
In order to accommodate different architecting methodologies, we have detailed
the dependence of each of the actions in Fig. 6.3 on each other in the crib sheet in
Table 6.1. This Table provides an overview of IoT architecting activities and
actions (left columns) and what relevant input one derives from other IoT
architecting activities and actions (horizontal).
Figure 6.3 gives a detailed view of the actions taking place within each activity
(Create context view; Requirement process; Derive other views).
• In Red: actions that are particular to the IoT-A architecting framework and that
directly contribute to the architecture documentation;
• In Orange: actions that are not unique to the IoT-A architecting process, but that
enjoy an emphasis in the IoT-A framework;
• In Green: other activities and documents that directly contribute to the architec-
ture documentation;
• In Blue: actions that are not unique to the IoT-A architecting process, but that
enjoy an emphasis in the IoT-A framework
• <<flow>>: information flow into a document.
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6.5 IoT ARM Contributions to the Generation of
Architectures
After the previous detailed overview of the architecting actions related to the
generation of an IoT architecture, we are now finally ready for a discussion of
how the IoT ARM contributes to the generation of specific architectures. As already
outlined in Sect. 6.2, we do not prescribe a particular methodology for the genera-
tion of the architecture. The choice of a particular methodology is contingent upon
factors such as the organisational structure of the architecting team, its “architecture
history”, international standards or agreements that need to be adhered to, etc.
Rather than prescribing a particular methodology and thus limiting its application
range, the IoT ARM provides support and guidance for almost all of the actions and
activities that are part of any architecting process (Fig. 6.4).
This figure gives a detailed view of the actions taking place within each activity
and what parts of this document contribute to these activities and actions. The
rectangular dark-red boxes represent sections in this document while <<flow>>
represents information flow.
Table 6.2 discusses in more detail what each part of the IoT ARM contributes
exactly to each of these actions and activities. This table also is intended to serve as
a crib sheet for the architecting process.
6.6 Minimum Set of Functionality Groups
One question that we have often received concerns the least common denominator
in terms of Functionality Groups of architectures that are derived from the IoT
ARM. In other words: what Functionality Groups are part of any conceivable IoT
ARM architecture?
The core aspects of IoT are things and communication. The things, i.e. Physical
Entities (see Sect. 7.3) are accessed through devices, and data etc. pertaining to the
Physical Entities is relayed by means of communication. Physical Entities are
represented by Virtual Entities. Usually, the data is accessed via an application.
Since we stipulate a service-oriented architecture framework in which the resources
exposing data etc. about the Virtual Entities (and hence the Physical Entities) are
exposed by IoT services, the minimum set of Functionality Groups is:
• Application Functionality Group
• IoT Service Functionality Group
• Communication Functionality Group
• Device Functionality Group
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Fig. 6.4 IoT architecture generation (expansion of Fig. 6.3) summarises the parts of the IoT ARM



































Fig. 6.5 Using IoT-A Unified Requirements and IoT ARM for concrete system architecture work
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Note that this does not imply that other Functionality Groups (for instance, the
Management Functionality Group) are optional. Rather, it means that for certain
requirement sets these Functionality Groups are not needed.
6.7 Usage of Unified Requirements
6.7.1 Introduction
This section proposes guidelines to system architects on how to use the (already
existing) Unified Requirement list (UNIs) during the Requirements process activity
of their IoT architecture-generation process (Fig. 6.2). Such usage is by no means
mandatory, as Requirement Engineering can be performed following the process
described in Sect. 6.4 – however the UNIs list can serve as a helper tool to both the
elicitation of requirements and to the system specification.
It is well known to system designers that requirement engineering is a crucial
activity in system and software engineering. In the abundant documentation on the
topic (e.g. Hull et al. 2011; Pohl 2010), one can distinguish three main steps where
requirements play a role in designing complex systems: requirements elicitation
(generally based on stakeholders input); deriving the system’s specification from
these requirements; and validating the implemented architecture.
As part of the work on the IoT Architectural Reference Model, UNIs were
inferred and then published at http://www.IoT-a.eu/public/requirements. For more
details on how these Unified Requirements were derived can be found elsewhere in
the literature (Magerkurth et al. 2013). As these requirements do not apply to a
concrete system, but rather to a Reference Architecture and a Reference Model
applicable to all potential IoT systems, the reader needs to keep in mind a number of
specifics before considering these Unified Requirements as input for the process of
architecture translation:
• The Unified Requirement list should be seen as a basis and a living document.
Although it tries to cover the whole spectrum of requirements families that
could be applied to the IoT domain, it cannot be considered to be exhaustive,
as, for instance, future regulation and legislation could impose requirements
unforeseen at the time of publication. Additionally, Unified Requirements are
often formulated on a quite high abstraction level (something largely avoided in
concrete system’s requirement engineering), resulting in requirements that are,
for instance, mapped onto one or several views and possibly perspectives (again,
something that concrete system designers tend to avoid);
• Formulation of requirements expressed by external or internal stakeholders
(description field in the used Volere template) may sometimes apply directly
to the IoT ARM (e.g. UNI.094 “The Reference Architecture shall support any
IoT business scenario”), but in most cases they apply to a concrete system that
can be implemented using the IoT ARM. In that latter case, they express
characteristics on the system that the IoT ARM should enable to specify,
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meaning they require to be interpreted by the reader/system designer to see how
they apply to their own case – hence the wording “the system shall . . .” generally
used. Let us take for instance UNI.021 “The user shall be able to control the
radio activity of the system”: depending on the actual usage of radio communi-
cation, on the role of the user and on the importance of controlling the radio
activity of the system in the concrete architecture, this requirement may be
dropped, or specialised. In any case reinterpreting Unified Requirements is
necessary (more on this in the following);
• Mapping to perspectives/views/functional groups and components is done on
a lowest-common-denominator basis – e.g. it indicates which aspects are defi-
nitely impacted by a given Unified Requirement, but the reader should keep in
mind that in certain (concrete system) specific cases, additional components may
need to be considered. For instance, the Device Functionality Group is out of
scope of the IoT ARM (see Figure “Functional-decomposition viewpoint” of the
IoT Reference Architecture in Sect. 8.2.2.) and is therefore not listed in mapping
of functional Unified Requirements, while it clearly needs to be considered when
devising a concrete IoT system. Another instance is the lack of differentiation of
the data plane vs. management plane in the IoT ARM, as this is a clear design
choice (see Sect. 6.9).
• As pointed out in the ARM document, Sect. 6.4 and for the reasons explained
there, the categorisation of the UNIs does not fully match that of the IoT ARM
process and one needs to map the UNI categories onto that of the process in order
to utilise the UNIs for the generation of architectures. Table 6.3 below provides
this mapping information.
In a nutshell, the reader should keep in mind that the IoT ARM in general, and
the Unified Requirement list in particular, should rather be seen as an inspirational
than as a normative document.
6.7.2 Using Unified Requirements
IoT-A Unified Requirements (UNIs) can be used by system designers at two stages
of their work: requirement elicitation and system specification.
Table 6.3 Translation table for UNI requirement types from and to IoT ARM requirement types
UNI requirement type IoT ARM requirement type Indicated by
Design constraint Design constraint –
Functional requirement View requirement –
Non-functional requirement View requirement Mapping of UNI onto a view
Qualitative requirement Mapping of UNI onto one or more
Perspectives
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6.7.2.1 Requirement Elicitation
UNIs can be used in a number of ways by system designers to identify
“requirements topics” for their concrete system.
First, UNIs can be seen as seeds for deriving or instantiating concrete (precise)
requirements from the broader, more abstract wording of Unified Requirements
(Fig. 6.5- 1). For instance, UNI.018 reads “The system shall support data processing
(filtering, aggregation/fusion, etc.) on different IoT-system levels (for instance
device level)” (see Appendix). Based on this broad formulation, the system
designer may derive his own requirements, identifying what kind of processing,
on what kind of data, needs to happen where in his system.
Second, the mapping of the UNIs to Use Cases, facets of the IoT ARM (Models,
Functional Groups, and Functional Components) or more informal categories can
be used to filter and identify which topics and related UNIs should be considered by
the system designer as potential candidates for instantiation on their own system.
For example, using the web-based list, one can perform a global search on the word
‘communication’ (search all columns box), or filter all requirements categorised
with the tag communication (Category column filter), or those which are sorted
under the Communication Functionality Group (Functionality Group column filter)
to see which UNIs in general apply to a given system.
6.7.2.2 System Specification
UNIs, and in particular their mapping to the IoT ARM, can also be useful to system
designers during the specification phase. By identifying a UNI generalizing an
already identified (concrete) system requirements (Fig. 6.5- 2.a), the various
mapping on the IoT ARM enable the system designer to identify which IoT ARM
components or more generally aspects are impacted by this requirement, and from
there which concrete systems components or aspects need to be investigated
(Fig. 6.5- 2.b). Figure 6.6 below presents this process using UML Activity diagram
representation. Note that the “No corresponding UNI” case induces “regular”
requirement engineering (i.e. without IoT ARM support).
For UNIs mapped on the Functional View, this enables the system designer to
identify candidate functions in the concrete architecture that will be impacted by
the overarching concern formulated in the UNI. For instance, UNI.623 reads
“The system shall support location privacy”. This requirement is mapped on the
Security and Privacy Perspective, which means that the system designer should
consider this Perspective when deriving her own system requirements (more on this
below). This UNI is also mapped onto four Functional Components in three
different Functionality Groups of the Reference Architecture (namely IoT Service,
IoT Service Resolution for the IoT Service FG; Authorisation for the Security FG;
and VE Resolution for the Virtual Entity FG). After identifying how these FCs are
instantiated (or not) in a concrete system, the system designer can use such a
mapping to derive where the considered requirement(s) impact the concrete
architecture.
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Similarly, for UNIs assigned to quality aspects of the architecture (captured
through ARM Perspectives), the mapping of UNIs onto design choices mapping
(see Sect. 6.9 allows exploring perspectives and associated design choices that are
impacted by a given UNI, and which therefore should be considered by the system
designer. For instance, UNI.058 which reads “The system shall provide high
availability” is mapped onto the Availability and Resilience ARM Perspective,
and can be instantiated using two Design Choices (namely Cluster by location and
Cluster by type of Resources). A corresponding concrete system requirement would
typically provide more details (such as availability rate, etc.). After identifying
which Perspectives apply (and how) to their concrete system, the system designer
can use such a UNI-to-Perspective mapping to derive which quality aspects of the
concrete architecture are impacted by the considered requirement(s).
6.8 Threat Analysis
As part of the setup of an IoT architecture, risk planning and resulting architectural
decisions are of highest importance. The risk analysis carried out in this section
aims therefore at assessing risks pertaining to the IoT, and at classifying them
Identify UNI corresponding







Assess applicability of View
mapping for concrete architecture
Assess applicability of Models
mapping for concrete architecture
Assess applicability of Perspectives
mapping for concrete architecture





Fig. 6.6 How to use UNI to IoT ARM mapping to identify impacts of a given requirement on a
concrete system architecture – activity diagram
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according to the underlying mechanisms they apply to, the elements they affect, and
the overall criticality they present.
Risk analysis traditionally begins with a definition of the elements that have to
be protected. Then, an analysis of possible threats is conducted. How identified
threats may actually affect elements to be protected, leads to the definition of risks.
These risks have to be categorised, taking into account parameters such as critical-
ity or probability of occurrence.
Various risk-analysis methods have been promoted in the literature, such as the
French EBIOS (Ebios 2010) and OCTAVE (OCTAVE). The methodology for risk
analysis that has been chosen in IoT-A, and that is used in this section, is based on
Microsoft STRIDE/DREAD (Microsoft 2003). This choice has two reasons: first,
this methodology is designed for assessing risks in the field of communications and
information systems; second, it is mostly based on the analysis of architecture
models and communications flows (instead of, for example, partly relying on
experts interviews such as in EBIOS), which makes it a good fit for the ARM.
The reasons for this are twofold. First, IoT, by it very name, encompasses informa-
tion systems and communication. Second, no IoT-A-implementations are available
at the time of writing. Therefore, the analysis has to centre on the Reference
Architecture itself.
This section is organised as follows: first, a list of elements to be protected is
provided. Then, the threats that may affect these elements (risk sources) are
reviewed. The review follows the STRIDE classification. More details on STRIDE
are provided below. The identified risks are then summarised and each risk is
assessed in accordance with the DREAD methodology/metric.
This risk analysis is intended to be used as input for the derivation of
architectures from the IoT ARM and for also for guiding the evolution of such
architectures. By so doing one makes them more resilient against the most critical
risks.
6.8.1 Elements to Protect
What elements need to be protected depends on the considered scenario. However,
the IoT ARM was derived from the synthesis of a wide range of use-case areas, and
identifying elements to be protected becomes rapidly very broad and multi-faceted.
Instead, we decided to focus on the least common denominator of all use-case
scenarios on which the IoT ARM is built. In other words, this analysis only looks at
general elements to be protected, and this study is thus a good but non-exhaustive
starting point for the study of a particular scenario to which the IoT ARM is going to
be applied. The scenarios encompassed by the IoT ARM include:
• Transportation and logistics;
• Smart home;
• Smart city;




• Energy (Smart Grid).
The following elements to be protected were identified:
• Physical person: This represents the human user. Threats affecting the human
user are usually qualified as relating to ‘safety’ instead of ‘security’. Such threats
may arise if a critical service is diverted or made unavailable by an attacker. An
example for this is a malicious service that returns erroneous information, or
even information specifically shaped to create hazardous situations. The eHealth
scenario is the most critical concerning such attacks. Notice that the level of this
criticality of course depends on the degree of automation. It is likely that most
critical decisions will still require the involvement of a human operator;
• Subject’s privacy: This element represents all information elements that a
subject (either a user or a device) does not explicitly agree to make publicly
available, or whose availability shall be restrained to a controlled set of other
subjects;
• Communications channel: The communication channel itself has to be
protected. Common threats are attacks against the integrity of the data that are
exchanged over the channel. Examples for such attacks are tampering and replay
attacks. The communication channel shall also be protected against attacks
aiming at the routing functionality of the underlying network (black hole,
worm hole, depletion, etc.) (Mathur and Subbalakshmi 2007);
• Leaf devices: IoT-A leaf devices represent the wide variety of IoT elements that
are interconnected by the common IoT-A infrastructure. Tags, readers, sensors,
and actuators are examples for leaf devices. Various protection schemes relevant
to their object class capabilities are to be implemented. These schemes need to
ensure the integrity of the software, hardware, and the location of these devices;
• Intermediary devices: Intermediary devices provide services to IoT-A leaf
devices and they also enable communication. A gateway designed to intercon-
nect constrained and unconstrained domains is an example of such an interme-
diary device. Disabling or tampering critical intermediary devices can lead to
denial-of-service attacks against the service infrastructure. Such attacks are
within the scope of our analysis. However, attacks against specific intermediary
devices that offer non-critical facilitating functions are outside the scope of our
analysis and have thus to be considered case by case;
• Backend services: Backend services represent server-side applicative elements
(for instance data-collection server communicating with sensor nodes).
Compromising this software or the devices they are deployed on generally
represents a critical threat against specific application systems and has to be
prevented;
• Infrastructure services: Discovery, lookup and resolution services are very
critical services as they provide worldwide fundamental functionalities to IoT
systems. In the same way, security services (authorization, authentication,
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identity management, key management, and trust and reputation) are essential
for a secure interaction between subjects (as defined above);
• Global systems/facilities: This last category of elements to protect considers
entire services in a global manner. For example, there might be a risk that an
attack against the smart home scenario results in the complete disruption of the
service, e.g. through the disruption of underlying communications between
devices. The consequences of this resulting disruption can therefore be consid-
ered through this category.
6.8.2 Risk Sources
The risk sources are categorised following the STRIDE (Microsoft 2003) classifi-
cation, which is a widely used way of classifying threats that relate to information
systems. STRIDE stands for Spoofing identity, Tampering with data, Repudiation,
Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. These
categories are quickly summarised below – note, however, that real-world
occurrences usually consist of a combination of these threats.
• Identity spoofing means that a peer illegitimately uses the identity of another
peer. Spoofing attacks can happen with respect to all kind of identifiers,
irrespective of whether they are used to designate physical persons, devices, or
communication flows;
• Data tampering means that an attacker is able to alter the content of data
exchanged between two or more peers. Data tampering may involve subtle
attack schemes, wherein the attacker is able to trigger specific behaviours of
recipients by finely modifying original data;
• Repudiation relates to attacks in which an attacker performs illegitimate actions
and may afterwards deny having performed them, such that other nodes are
unable to prove that the attacker actually behaved maliciously;
• Information disclosure means that information is disclosed to unauthorised
peers. It is related to the existence of an authorisation model that defines for each
information element a set of peers that are authorised to access it, possibly under
some specific conditions;
• Denial-of-service attacks are carried out for disabling a service offered to
legitimate users (as opposed, for example, to more subtle schemes wherein the
attacked service can be altered, e.g. making a search service return false results,
without the legitimate users being able to notice it);
• Elevation of privilege may occur in systems that feature different classes of
users, each class being mapped to a specific set of rights. Illegitimate elevation
of privilege occurs when an attacker manages to acquire rights that would
normally only be granted to more privileged class(es). In the most critical
case, an attacker may obtain administration rights for the entire system, or part
of it, which means that the attacker may perform arbitrary actions on the
elements the attacker has access to, thereby being able to destroy the system
or entirely change its behaviour.
70 M. Boussard et al.
The risk sources considered here are restricted according to the following rules:
• Non-human risk sources either global (flood, lightning, fire, electrical, heat) or
local (individual device failure) are not considered. Only human risk sources are.
Note that a human forging a faked device identity in order to impersonate
another device fits within the category of “human risk”;
• Among human risk sources, only theft/loss and hacker-initiated attacks are
considered. Technical staff errors or accidents are not considered. In other
words we are only addressing malicious attacks and not involuntary attacks.
The STRIDE classification is used below in Table 6.4, immediately afterwards,
on STRIDE classification] to identify risks, as intersections between a STRIDE
item (column) and an element to protect (row).
6.8.3 Risk Assessment
Identified risks were assessed using the DREADmethodology based on (simplified)
metrics. DREAD, defines scoring methodology and metrics that help to evaluate the
criticality of an identified threat. DREAD stands for Damage potential, Reproduc-
ibility, Exploitability, Affected users, and Discoverability. It defines the criteria
according to which a threat is evaluated. Each criterion is quantified at levels
between 0 and 10. Eventually, the threat can be globally rated (sum of D, R, E,
A, D ratings), or the threat can be described along with its individual ratings. The
latter approach allows, obviously, for a more precise analysis. A simpler scheme for
DREAD, used in what follows, consists of only three levels, viz. L (low), M
(medium) and H (high) for each DREAD rating.
Note that a ‘High’ rating for Exploitability means that it is easy for an attacker to
carry out an attack leading to the identified threat, whereas a ‘High’ rating in
Discoverability means that it is difficult to discover the threat. This is to ensure a
coherent approach, in which ‘Low’ ratings decrease the overall criticality of a risk,
whereas ‘High’ ratings increase it.
The DREAD methodology and metric is used in Table 6.5, immediately after-
wards, on DREAD assessment] for evaluating the risks identified in Table 6.4, the
previous one, on STRIDE classification]. In addition to the DREAD rating, the
Table 6.5 on DREAD assessment]also provides initial information on specific
threats that may lead to the occurrence of the identified risk. In addition to this
information, initial steps toward threat mitigation are provided. Furthermore, it
links mitigation scenarios to the design choices (noted DC X.n) elaborated on in
Sect. 6.9.
6.8.4 Discussion
Assessing the risks that relate to the Internet of Things and putting them in
perspective with the Design Choices (see Design Choices) leads to interesting
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synthetic conclusions. First, we recognise in the risks and their mitigation
mechanisms the well-known distinction between internal attacks and external
attacks. This distinction implies the existence of a discrimination function that
makes the system able to distinguish among authorised players (hence, able to
launch internal attacks) and unauthorised players (restrained to external attacks).
Second, it is also noticeable that some risks are not mapped to design choices –
rather, they can be mitigated through dedicated context-dependent or local (entity-
scope) security-by-design decisions. These concepts are elaborated on in what
follows.
The distinction between internal and external attackers pertains to their ability to
undergo an authorisation procedure, at the end of which only authorised players
acquire some rights. These rights in turn enable the attackers to launch internal
attacks. Note that this authorisation procedure may be characterised by more than
the rejected/authorized two levels of granularity and define a full set of access
policies. In this case, all but entirely rejected players are in position to launch
internal attacks.
The defence against external attacks is traditionally based on two means:
topological defence systems that almost spatially keep the attackers out of reach
of the protected resources (e.g. firewalls) and cryptographic mechanisms
(e.g. authentication or encryption algorithms) that logically prevent attackers to
tamper with or otherwise access the protected resources.
• In the framework of IoT, special emphasis is put on one-to-one transactions
wherein a service is accessed by a remote player. These transactions require a
secure transaction set up. The service-access control involves in its most
secure embodiments an authentication phase that can be based on various
authenticating credentials. It has to be noted, though, that these authenticating
credentials have to be mapped to an identity in order to fulfil their role. When the
peer identity is not known prior to establishing a transaction, it has to be securely
retrieved (resolved) from the resolution infrastructure. Likewise, the services
themselves may need to be securely orchestrated;
• Upon successful authentication, access control has to be enforced in order to
bind all data units exchanged between two players to their respective
authenticated identities. This takes usually the form of an authentication proce-
dure being implemented as an authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocol, and
all subsequent messages exchanged between the same two players are then
integrity protected by the AKE-obtained session key. Various protocols exist
for doing so: at the network layer, the Host Identity Protocol Base Exchange
(HIP BEX) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) are AKE protocols and IPsec is the
corresponding secure data transport protocol. At the transport layer, TLS hand-
shake is an AKE protocol for subsequent (D)TLS exchanges. Various service-
specific protocols can of course also be used. Eventually, all risks mitigated by
integrity protections should rely on specific cryptographically protected access-
control schemes;
• In parallel with secure transaction set up and access-control-based integrity
protection, protection against internal attacks requires a coherent arrangement
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of the associated cryptographic primitives which have to be based on an
assessment of the attacker profile and capabilities. Many design choices
proposes different embodiments that provide different security levels. For
example the perfect forward secrecy property is theoretically a more secure
one. However, this additional security property would prove worthwhile only for
an attacker able to (and interested in) accessing data exchanged in the past
(hence possibly obsolete) but that the attacker would nevertheless have stored
under an encrypted form. Clearly, most of attacker models and data criticality do
not fit within this attack scenario. If one decides to envision it, though, the same
attacker capabilities should be assumed for all other risks.
Protection against internal attacks is illustrated in the Table 6.5 on DREAD
assessment by the reliance on autonomous security design choices (DC A.16,17).
Classically, only behavioural analysis can allow identifying misbehaviours of an
otherwise authorised node. Autonomous security can be instantiated under a wide
variety of forms that pertain to the implemented functions in a given IoT infrastruc-
ture. Whenever behavioural patterns can be defined, deviations from these patterns
can be detected and flagged as suspicious. More generically (and more easily), logs
should be enabled as a rudimentary form of reactive security. Logs can be generated
at various places in the network but will generally be aggregated at server-side,
where they will be collected for further uses such as service management
(e.g. dimensioning), lawful requirements or billing preparation. However, logging
user activity or detecting identifying patterns within it countervents privacy.
Autonomous security and privacy are in general mutually contradictory. Pseudo-
nymity can be seen as an intermediary state, although pseudonyms are only
worthwhile as long as they can be resolved to real identities at some point in the
network. Choosing which scheme to favour is a question of high-level design
choice. Diametrically opposed to privacy, non-repudiation plays a specific role
that has to be reviewed here. In general, this security service, which ensures that an
entity will not be in position of denying having performed a given transaction, is
provided at service layer where both signature-based cryptographic primitives and
transaction concept become relevant. Although the associated risk (repudiation) is
part of the STRIDE classification, service-level non-repudiation was not considered
in the previous section, being judged to be pertaining to policies, themselves
associated to particular applications. In fact, services for which non-repudiation
has to be provided are part of highly specific applications (e.g. inter-bank
communications of aggregated banking transactions, or administration of highly-
critical assets), which does not qualify them as generic mitigation means.
Finally, it is worth explaining why some identified risks are “not specifically
targeted” in IoT-A, with no relevant technology being developed and no design
choice being proposed. These non-targeted risks are of two sorts. Some of them are
dependent on highly contextual physical parameters. They depend on the
particularities of the communication technology that is put in place and, as such,
exhibit highly diverse characteristics in terms of involved stakes. Accordingly, the
existing mitigations can only be implemented at the physical layer with variable
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costs in terms of, for instance, efficiency. The other non-targeted security risks
pertain to in-entity security-by-design policies. For example, the protection of a
given operating system or the choice to encrypt a user database fit into this category.
As such, they cannot be qualified as being typical for the IoT environment.
6.9 Design Choices
6.9.1 Introduction
By following the architectural methodology according to (Rozanski and Woods
2011) it is recommended to apply the architectural perspectives to the views on an
architecture in order to design systems that satisfy qualities like high performance,
high scalability or interoperability. This step in the architectural methodology is
similar to constructing the interrelationships between customer requirements and
technical requirements in the ‘House of Quality’ matrix as applied in the Quality-
Function Deployment (Erder and Pureur 2003) introduced in Sect. 6.4.
This section guides an architect by giving design choices for the architectural
viewpoints defined in the Reference Architecture in Section 8.2 for each perspec-
tive listed in Sect. 8.3. Figure 6.7 illustrates that the perspectives ‘Evolution &
Interoperability’, ‘Performance & Scalability’, ‘Trust, Security & Privacy’, and
‘Availability & Resilience’ are applied to the ‘Functional View‘, the ‘Information
View’ as well as the ‘Deployment & Operation View’ respectively.
While applying perspectives to views not every view is impacted by the
perspectives in the same manner or grade. Rosanski and Woods distinguish
between three grades of applicability (high, medium and low) for each perspective
to each view. Table 6.6 illustrates the perspective to view applicability as presented
in (Rozanski and Woods 2011).
In this section we focus mainly on the perspective and view pairs where the
applicability of the perspective to the view is high. According to the Table 6.6 these
pairs are the following:
None of the perspectives have a high impact when applied to the Operational
View. This is an indicator for not considering the Operational View in the RA
(Sect. 8.2) and therefore in this section respectively. The Concurrency View is not
being considered in the RA Sect. 8.2 either, thus the applicability to this view, even
with a high impact, is not followed up in this section.
Additionally, we do not present design choices for particular platforms
(i.e. recommendations for specific hardware and software) as they would give the
current status of available platforms at the time of editing this document only, but
the recommendations could become obsolete soon after. Software architects are
well advised to look for suitable platform solutions while designing their concrete
architectures. Platforms that were researched during the project (Magerkurth 2011)
are based on the OSGi framework (OSGi 2012). This framework specifies among
others how software can be deployed in form of bundles and how the application
lifecycle can be controlled remotely. The OSGi framework is a recommended
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design choice for the Deployment and Operation View. Based on the experience
obtained in the project we recommend OSGi framework as a design choice for the
Deployment and Operation Views with hardware platforms that provide support for
OSGi. However, OSGi framework is not advisable for very constraint computing
platforms.
According to Rozanski/Wood “a tactic is much more general and less
constraining than a classical design pattern because it does not mandate a particular
software structure but provides general guidance on how to design a particular
Fig. 6.7 Applying perspectives to views (Rozanski 2011; Fig. 6.4–1)








Functional Medium Medium Low High
Information Medium Medium Low High
Deployment High High High Low
Operational Medium Low Medium Low
Concurrency Low High Medium Medium
View
Table 6.7 Focus on high perspective to view ability
Architectural perspective Architectural view
Evolution and interoperability Functional
Information
Availability and resilience Deployment
Performance and scalability Deployment
Trust, security and privacy Deployment
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aspect of your system” (Rozanski and Woods 2011). Following Rozanski and
Wood’s definition this section picks up the tactics addressing the architectural
perspectives listed in Sect. 8.3 and presents technology agnostic design patterns
or other architectural solutions that are suitable to apply the tactics. Architects are
then able to either implement the recommended design choices or to look for
existing solutions that have implemented those choices.
6.9.2 Design Choices Addressing Evolution and
Interoperability
The Evolution perspective addresses the fact that requirements change and software
evolves sometimes rapidly. We identified a second, closely related, perspective
namely Interoperability which plays a crucial role especially in IoT. The vision of
the Internet of Things is still evolving. Many current technologies are not yet
mature enough for operational use and there are many more technologies to come
in the future. The Evolution and Interoperability Perspective is shown in Sect. 8.3.1.
The tactics for evolution and interoperability are the key concepts of the IoT ARM
and will be explained in Table 6.8.
Both, the Reference Model and the Reference Architecture are built to be
extensible and to enable interoperability between Devices and Services. Therefore
the activities listed in Sect. 8.3.1reflect the IoT-A approach in detail:
• Characterize the evolution needs: IoT-A has collected stakeholder and
also internal requirements reflecting the actual and future needs in IoT systems
(see IoT-A 2013);
• Assess the current ease of evolution: Also through the stakeholder workshops
and in addition the use cases from WP7 and the state of the art analysis from
WP1 and all technical work packages, the current status was collected;
• Consider the evolution trade-offs: The evolution trade-offs are heavily
domain- and application-specific and are not part of the IoT-A work. Those
trade-offs must of course be discussed when creating an architecture for a
concrete application;
• Rework the architecture: The main result of IoT-A are the Reference Model
and the Reference Architecture which were designed with interoperability in
focus (see Sect. 7.5 and Chap. 8).
Moreover, Rozanski and Woods (2011) also introduce tactics to deal with
interoperability and evolution. Here also the IoT-A Reference Model and Reference
Architecture adapt the following tactics:
• Create extensible interfaces, Apply design techniques that facilitate change:
IoT-A defines common entities, e.g. the IoT Domain Model, see Sect. 7.3, and
entry points, e.g. the IoT Communication Model, see Sect. 7.6, which can be
used to create IoT-A compliant systems;
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• Apply metamodel-based architectural styles: The IoT-A Reference Model
and Reference Architecture define interoperability on architectural level. Espe-
cially the Domain Model, see Sect. 7.3, and the IoT Information Model, see
Sect. 7.4, as metamodels are open for further extensions;
• Build variation points into the software, Use standard extension points: By
using standardised protocols and gateways, even legacy devices are able to be
linked to IoT-A systems.
Design Choices for Interoperability and Evolution cannot be named on this
(application and domain independent) level. The IoT Reference Model and Refer-
ence Architecture are built with interoperability and evolution as the main drivers.
To allow a system to evolve and to react to new technology and new requirements
the following general remarks should be kept in mind:
• The IoT-A Reference Architecture is built out of modular blocks to allow
changes and additions. When deriving the IoT-A work to a concrete architecture,
this modularity and also the loose coupling between those blocks should be
kept. This concept is also used in the ‘Dispatcher’ component (Hyttinen P ed
et al. 2013) for the standardized processing of incoming requests without
exposing the internal methods and functions;
• Not all of the systems functionality can be defined in advance. Therefore, some
additional spaces and extensions points, e.g. for upcoming functionality, should
be reserved. This can for example be done in interface definitions or data models,
like the reserved bits in the TCP header definition. This allows the designers and
architects to update the system and to adapt it to new requirements.
The tactics not considered as relevant are listed in Table 6.9.
Table 6.8 Tactics addressing evolution and interoperability
Desired
quality
The ability of the system to be flexible in the face of the inevitable change that all
systems experience after deployment, balanced against the costs of providing
such flexibility
Tactics Create extensible interfaces
Apply design techniques that facilitate change
Apply metamodel-based architectural styles
Build variation points into the software
Use standard extension points
Table 6.9 Tactics identified as not relevant for evolution and interoperability in IoT Systems
Tactic Reason
Contain change Not possible for public IoT-systems, new devices will participate in
the systems
Achieve reliable change Same as above
Preserve development
environments
Due to the multiplicity of developers and technology providers, a
common development environment will not exist
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Table 6.10 Tactics addressing performance and scalability
Desired
quality
The ability of the system to predictably execute within its mandated performance
profile and to handle increased processing volumes in the future if required
Tactics Optimize repeated processing
Replication
Prioritize processing
Distribute processing over time
Minimize the use of shared resources
Reuse resources and results
Partition and parallelize





Table 6.11 Tactics and corresponding design choices for performance and scalability
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6.9.3 Design Choices Addressing Performance and
Scalability
Performance and scalability are closely related. In the Internet of Things, with its
anticipated billion or trillion nodes both performance and scalability will play a
crucial role. In Sect. 8.3.1 the Performance and Scalability Perspective together
with a set of tactics are presented. In the following we applied the tactics from the
Performance and Scalability Perspective to our Design Choices. We furthermore
evaluated their expected impact on the Functional, Information, and Deployment
and Operation Views.
Not all tactics are explained in detail in this section. The tactic “Make Design
compromises”, for example, was omitted, as being too general and as the whole
idea of the design choices it to make compromises. Additionally, as performance is
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highly advisable to run through the corresponding activities like creating a perfor-
mance model or conduct practical testing with measurements. The full list of
activities are listed in Sect. 8.3.
6.9.3.1 Replication
The functional components (DC PS.1) and the information (DC PS.2) stored can be
replicated to increase performance and scalability (DC PS.3). Having a single
functional component is often against good scalability. The availability of informa-
tion depends on the availability of the IoT device. Having instances of functional
components and information available remotely (for example, in the cloud) usually
increases both scalability and performance (DC PS.4). Nonetheless, in this case one
needs to be enough connectivity and bandwidth provided.
6.9.3.2 Prioritize Processing
To be able to prioritize processing the functional components needs to be aware that
it might be required to prefer one type of processing over the other. Therefore, the
information model needs to be able to provide information that indicates priorities
of processes, for instance high, normal, or low.. In terms of deployment the
prioritized processing can be done with the help of the network stack (DC PS.7)
or there can be different functional components for the different priorities
(DC PS.8).
6.9.3.3 Partition and Parallelize
Partition and Parallelize aims towards increase both scalability, as well as,
performance by making the functional components aware of multi-threading/
multi-programming (DC PS.9). Furthermore the information needs to be
partitionable (reduce interdependencies between information) (DC PS.10). The
deployment can help a lot in partitioning, as in IoT access to IoT services are
often locally distributed. This can be done either location aware (DC PS.11), or
based on a data-flow model (DC PS.12).
As an example, the Virtual Entity resolution could be location-oriented, where a
resolution server (RS) is responsible for indexing all connected things in a certain
geographical area, called indexing scope. A Catalogue server then creates the
Catalogue Index of every RS’ indexing scope. A resolution request is redirected
towards the RS whose indexing scope intersects the search scope of the request.
Large-scale IoT systems are expected to have multiple administrative domains that
must be handled by a federated resolution infrastructure. Different domains interact
with each other by the means of a central domain directory or domain catalogue.
Another possibility would be a federated infrastructure, in which Virtual Entities
are clustered based on similarity. Dedicated places are in charge of the IoT Services
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they offer and provide their descriptions as part of a distributed resolution frame-
work. The framework is scalable and fault tolerant because of distribution.
6.9.3.4 Reduce Computational Complexity
Whenever possible the system can reduce the computational complexity, thus
leading to a simpler system which needs less time and often energy. As an example,
instead of a complex intrusion detection system, there could either be no intrusion
detection at all (DC PS.13) or a less complex security by design (DC PS.14), e.g. a
protocol stack with built in threshold-based protection against too many session
initiations.
6.9.3.5 Distribute Processing Over Time
To reduce the number of resources needed it is often possible to distribute some
processing tasks over time, when their results are not immediately necessary
(DC PS.16). In case of hard real-time constrains this might not be always possible,
but many system do not need real-time at all, or do only have soft real-time
constraints. Distributing processing over time can help preventing the system
from scaling or reduce the use of remote (over the web) services.
6.9.3.6 Minimize Used of Shared Resources
In many IoT systems the most scare and most expensive resource is bandwidth,
especially in wireless battery powered systems. It is necessary to design the
functional components accordingly and especially plan the deployment to avoid
bottlenecks on the devices/resources.
6.9.3.7 Reuse Resources and Results
To be able to reuse resources and results the functional components need to be
aware of a history for reuse (DC PS.21). The information model needs be aware of
such caching mechanisms (DC PS.22). In terms of deployment the history can
either be stored locally (DC PS.23), remotely (DC PS.24) or a combination of both
(DC PS.25).
If the information history is stored locally (DC PS.23) the information history is
stored on the IoT device that has produced the information over time. History
information needs to be secured in the same way as the present information to avoid
information leaks. If constrained IoT devices are used, then the storage size of
information history as well as the information processing performance is limited:
Having a local storage place for history information on each IoT Device requires
less device performance and less effort to secure the history, but the single
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information host is against good scalability. The availability of information history
depends on the availability of the IoT device hosting the history.
DC PS.24 describes the case, where the information history is not stored on the
IoT Device that has produced the information, but on a different IoT Resource, to
which the information is uploaded to. The additional history resource needs to be
secured too with either the same S&P policies as the original IoT Resource or
different policies. A history resource in the cloud can perform better than IoT
devices; the replication of information allows load balancing between history and
present information which contributes to better scalability. The Information history
still exists when the respective IoT device becomes unavailable.
Furthermore it is possible to combine the two aforementioned approaches
(DC PS.25): The information history is stored on the IoT device that has produced
the information as well as on a different IoT Resource replicating the information.
History information that exceeds the capabilities of the hosting IoT device
capabilities can be offloaded to high performance devices. This design choice
contributes to high scalability as well as higher performance since the remotely
stored history information is a replication of the locally stored information.
Replicating information is cheaper to achieve by the device than retrieving
‘fresh’ information for every replication.
6.9.3.8 Scale Up or Scale Out
Scale up and scale out is one of the traditional ways to ensure scalability. Scale up
(also known as vertical scalability) means providing more resources on a single
system (DC PS.26/DC PS.28), scale out (also known as horizontal scaling) means
providing more computing power by adding resources. In IoT it is usually not that
easy to scale up or to scale out. One obvious possibility is, of course, to use cloud
support (DC PS.27/DC PS.29). Migration in sensor networks is possible to some
extend as well in a heterogeneous network.
6.9.3.9 Degrade Gracefully
Degrade gracefully is a property of a system, which allows it to continue operating
properly even in the event of failure in one ore more components. The functional
components need to be able to restart either completely (reset) or to rollback to a
previous stable state. In case of hardware failures redundancy and replication allow
to continue working even when a device/resource fails.
6.9.3.10 Use Asynchronous Processing
Asynchronous processing is usually intrinsic in IoT systems. All functional
components should be prepared to do asynchronous calculations and synchroniza-
tion needs to be planned accordingly.
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6.9.4 Design Choices Addressing Trust
In Sect. 8.3.3.1 the Trust Perspective together with a set of tactics is presented.
In Table 6.12 all tactics together with their Design Choices are listed. A detailed
description for each tactic follows the table.
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6.9.4.1 Harden Root of Trust
The root-of-trust is the core component upon which the trust policy is based. The
notion of a root-of-trust exists at multiple abstraction levels in a system, and can be
software (less secure) as well as hardware (higher security). As an example for
hardware realisation is RFID. The tags can be used to support anti-counterfeiting by
using a security protocol based on public key cryptography. In this case their root-
of-trust is based on a Physically Unclonable Device (PUF) (Verbauwhede and
Schaumont 2007).
6.9.4.2 Ensure High Quality of Data
Information quality is improved in the technical dimension (e.g. timeliness and
sampling). The suite of security protocols (SPINS) guarantees that an attack does
not affect the remainder nodes in the network and thus preserves data integrity and
freshness. In the context of the Information view it can be stated that data
containing information is improved in terms of content dimension (e.g. accuracy
or completeness) and intellectual dimension (e.g. reputation and trust). To reach
this level of security a secure network encryption protocol must be implemented
(Perrig et al. 2002).
6.9.4.3 Infrastructural Trust and Reputation Agents
The tactic “Infrastructural Trust and Reputation Agents for scalability” describes
the presence of a Trust and Reputation component FC (Sect. 7.7.1). This impacts
the information view as a Service Description should include relevant aspects for
what concerns trust evaluation (type of deployment, tamper-proof features of
hosting devices, authentication and authorization algorithms, etc. In case of periph-
eral devices the security of the deployment should be evaluated and asserted in the
subject description. Furthermore the web of trust concept to establish the authen-
ticity of the binding between a public key and its owner can be established. Its
decentralized trust model is an alternative to the centralized trust model of a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), which relies exclusively on a certificate authority (or a
hierarchy of such).
6.9.4.4 Provide High System Integrity
To provide high system integrity the integration of Reputation framework for high
integrity sensor networks (RFSN) can be considered (Ganeriwal and Srivastava
2004). It is capable of evaluating trust based on reputation and to act accordingly.
Furthermore second hand information (experiences of other parties, e.g. nodes)
about devices can be considered. It might be augmented by a Trust management
system which calculates Trust values as a function of availability and packet
forwarding.
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6.9.4.5 Avoid Leap of Faith
The avoidance of leap of faith increases the overall security; however, it might limit
the communication between certain parties as strong authentication is not feasible
in each case (e.g. constrained devices). From a functional point of view one option
can be a one-way hash chain to provide effective and efficient authentication. This
feature can be implemented by using a Lightweight Authentication protocol
(Lu and Pooch 2005).
For most of the tactics a design choice proposal is given, however for different
reasons it is not possible to provide appropriate design choices for all tactics. The
tactics not considered are presented in Table 6.13 with reasons for the omission.
6.9.5 Design Choices Addressing Security
In Sect. 8.3.3.2 the Security Perspective together with a set of tactics is presented.
The Design Choices addressing security are presented in Table 6.14 showing the
impact on architectural views by applying tactics relevant for security concerns.
6.9.5.1 Subject Authentication
For subject authentication two options are presented here. The first is the authenti-
cation over an encrypted channel while the other one is a crypto-based authentica-
tion solution over an open channel. The former uses the IoT-A Authentication FC
(Sect. 7.7.2) while for the ladder a peer-to-peer communication is realised over an
insecure channel.
Table 6.13 Omitted tactics for the trust perspective
Tactic Reason
Ensure physical security and
implement tampering detection
Pervasive deployment of IoT devices makes such devices
accessible to malicious users
Consider device security in the global
system design
Devices that are not tamper-proof can be compromised.
Although this aspect is related to the deployment view,
it has impacts on the design of the overall system and
trust evaluation
Consider the impact of security/
performance trade-offs on trust
This must be evaluated for each use case during the design
phase by means of tests such as simulation. For that
reason, no DC can be proposed
Use security imprinting Out of scope for IoT-A since devices are not covered in the
IoT Reference Architecture
Balance privacy vs. non-repudiation
(accountability)
If system requirements include non-repudiation, these will
necessarily impact the privacy feature of the designed
system. Privacy can be granted by using an Identity
Management. This component, run by a third party is
trusted for what concerns both privacy protection and
ability to track back malicious actions
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6.9.5.2 Use Access Policies
The tactic of using access policies is a crucial aspect in IoT. Two main functional
principles can be distinguished. The policy-based service access uses access control
mechanisms to manage to access to information. Therefore the information must be
managed accordingly so that it supports the used mechanism. This option can be
realised by using the IoT-A Authorisation FC component (Sect. 7.7.2). The other
possibility is to grant unrestricted access to services. This should be only done in
those cases in which data security is not relevant.
6.9.5.3 Secure Communication Infrastructure
Securing the communication infrastructure focuses on delivering a secure and
robust environment for the transmission of critical data. This can be obtained by
using end-to-end or hop-to-hop encryption. In both cases the information transmis-
sion channel in which the information flow from a device to an application through
an IoT service happens is completely secured. The end-to-end encryption uses
therefore the IoT-A End to End Communication FC and Key Exchange and
Management FC. Furthermore the Network Communication FC, which takes care
of enabling communication between networks through Locators (addressing) and
ID Resolution, is necessary (Sect. 7.7.2). For the hop-to-hop encryption the only
difference is the usage of the IoT-A hop-to-hop Communication FC. For wireless
communication security the implementation of an end-to-end security protocol
which ensures confidentiality, integrity and authentication of subjects can also be
considered (Perrig et al. 2004).
6.9.5.4 Secure Peripheral Networks (Link Layer Security, Secure
Routing)
To secure peripheral networks a link-layer encryption and authentication combined
with a multipath routing can be considered. This requires the integration of secure
routing protocols in the Network Communication component (Karlof and Wagner
2003).
For most of the tactics a design choice proposal is given, however for different
reasons it is not possible to provide appropriate design choices for all tactics. The
tactics not considered are presented in Table 6.15 with reasons for the omission.
6.9.6 Design Choices Addressing Privacy
In Sect. 8.3.3.3 the Security Perspective together with a set of tactics is presented.
The Design Choices addressing Privacy are presented in Table 6.16 showing the
impact on architectural views by applying tactics relevant for Privacy concerns.
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Infrastructural functional components are critical components
that can compromise the whole system if compromised
Avoid wherever possible
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6.9.6.1 Pseudonymisation
The tactic “Pseudonymisation” refers to a procedure by which fields that enable
identification of a user within a data record or subject are replaced by one or more
artificial identifiers. The purpose is to render the subject less identifiable and this
way lower IoT user (e.g. customer or patient) objections to its use. This is function-
ally implemented by the creation of a fictional identity (e.g. root identity, secondary
identity, pseudonym, or group identity) and can be realised by integrating the IoT-A
Identity Management FC (Sect. 7.7.3).
6.9.6.2 Avoid Transmitting Identifiers in Clear
The transmission of identifiers in clear should be avoided in general. In a WSN, a
base station is not only in charge of collecting and analysing data, but also used as
the gateway connecting the WSN with outside wireless or wired network. In order
to have a defence against local adversaries, the location information or identifier of
the base station is sent in clear in many protocols. This information must be hidden
from an eavesdropper, which can be done by traditional cryptographic techniques
(encryption). One option for encrypting wireless connections is the integration of a
wireless security algorithm proposed by (Peris-Lopez et al. 2007).
6.9.6.3 Minimize Unauthorized Access to Implicit Information
Unauthorized access to implicit information (e.g. deriving location information
from service access requests) must be restricted at all events. Access control
management as well as the enablement of a scalable and secure key distribution
between communication subjects can be considered to achieve this objective. In the
former case the information stored must be managed in a way so that the access
control mechanism is supported. For deployment of this function the IoT-A
Authorisation FC can be considered. For the secure key distribution the resolution
components should be augmented by a Key Exchange Management component
such as the one from IoT-A.
6.9.6.4 Enable the User to Control the Privacy Settings
Users should be given the opportunity to control their privacy settings. Hence, one
option is the control of acting anonymously. This function can be realised by
integrating the IoT-A Identity Management FC which creates a fictional identity
(root identity, secondary identity, pseudonym, or group identity) alongwith the related
security credentials for users and services to use during the authentication process.
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6.9.6.5 Privacy-Aware Identification
In human-to-thing and thing-to-thing interactions, privacy-aware identifiers might
be used to prevent unauthorized user tracking. Similarly, authentication can be used
to prove membership of a group without revealing unnecessary information about
an individual. Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) provide the option of only authenticating the responding host.
This way, the initiating host can stay anonymous (Heer et al. 2011).
For most of the tactics a design choice proposal is given, however for different
reasons it is not possible to provide appropriate design choices for all tactics. The
tactics not considered are presented in Table 6.17 with reasons for the omission:
6.9.7 Design Choices Addressing Availability and Resilience
The Chapter in this document concerned with the Availability and Resilience
Perspective (Sect. 8.3.4) lists tactics addressing the desired quality of the system
to be designed as shown in Table 6.18.
In this Section design choices are presented that apply most of the tactics listed
in Table 6.19. The tactics not considered here are given at the end of this
Section with an explanation why they have been omitted. Table 6.19 presents for
each tactic one or more architectural design choices together with their impact on
the architectural views introduced in Chap. 8.
6.9.7.1 Use High Availability Clustering
For design choice ‘VE Resolution location-oriented (DC A.1)’ a resolution server
(RS) is responsible for indexing all connected things in a certain geographical area,
called indexing scope. A Catalogue server then creates the Catalogue Index of
every RS’ indexing scope. A resolution request is redirected towards the RS whose
indexing scope intersects the search scope of the request. Large-scale IoT systems
are expected to have multiple administrative domains that must be handled by a
federated resolution infrastructure. Different domains interact with each other by
the means of a central domain directory or domain catalogue. Communication
between framework domains needs to be secured. The framework performs faster
through a divided search space. Indexing scope can be adjusted according to usage
load. The framework scales by adding more RSs. With this approach it is
Table 6.17 Omitted tactics for the privacy perspective
Tactic Reason
Validate against requirements Too general, no DC proposal possible
Consider the impact of security/per-
formance trade-offs on privacy
This must be evaluated for each use case during the
design phase. For that reason, no DC can be proposed
Balance privacy vs. non-repudiation
(accountability)
This must be evaluated for each use case during the
design phase. For that reason, no DC can be proposed
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impossible to retrieve things based on identifiers. Fault tolerance is achieved
through data distribution and index data replication. The central domain directory
is potential single point of failure. There is no theoretical limit on indexed things,
but indexing scope is bound to geographic location (De 2012).
In design choice ‘VE Resolution domain-oriented (DC A.2)’ a domain-oriented
VE Resolution approach organises the resolution framework in hierarchically
organised domains similar to Domain Name System (DNS). The hierarchy is
built according to the hierarchy of things captured by Virtual Entities from higher
granularity to lower granularity, e.g. country ! city ! district ! building !
room. The resolution framework performs faster than an unclustered resolution
solution through divided search space; its complexity is ofO(log n) in best case, and
O(n) in worst case, where n is the number of VEs hosted by the resolution
framework. Load balancing is supported through replication, and a Resource can
be member of different domains at a time. Fault tolerance is supported through
distribution and redundancy; the framework evolves with the number of things
connected (De 2012).
For design choice ‘VE Resolution Semantic Web-oriented (DC A.3)’ Semantic
Web technologies are used to annotate Virtual Entity descriptions in a way
machines can interpret them. This overcomes the need for exact syntactic match-
making between resolution request and search terms in the resolution infrastructure.
The search space of the resolution infrastructure is indexed by an unsupervised
machine-learning technique and clustered through latent factors derived from the
learning. This design is independent from the deployment of the resolution infra-
structure. Distribution and replication is supported by this approach, but depends on
implementation on how it is done. Semantic interoperability is achieved through
shared ontologies, after extending ontologies the training model needs to be
updated (De 2012).
A peer-to-peer infrastructure will maintain no centralised servers in design
choice ‘VE Resolution Peer-to-Peer-oriented (DC A.4)’, all data is distributed in
the network along with sophisticated retrieval and routing mechanisms. There are
several approaches on how to distribute the data (pure, centralised indexing server,
distributed hash tables). The latter approach is the recommended one for IoT
Table 6.18 Tactics addressing Availability and Resilience
Desired
quality
The ability of the system to be fully or partly operational as and when required and
to effectively handle failures that could affect system availability
Tactics Select fault-tolerant hardware
Use high-availability clustering and load balancing
Log transactions
Apply software availability solutions
Select or create fault-tolerant software
Design for failure
Allow for component replication
Relax transactional consistency
Identify backup and disaster recovery solution
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Resolution infrastructures. Resolution requests result in traffic complexity of O(n)
in worst case and O(log n) in best case, where n is the number of VEs managed by
the resolution framework. The framework is stable and robust through distribution
and redundancy (De 2012).
6.9.7.2 Load Balancing
The ‘Scale out approach (DC A.5)’ monitors the load of FCs during runtime and
triggers offloading tasks to another less busy instance of the respective FC to avoid
the FC being overloaded and therefore becoming a performance bottleneck or even
out of function. The decision at what limit an FC is considered to be critically busy
and to trigger off-loading to another instance is application specific, but the infor-
mation model needs to provide some metric to specify those parameters for FCs.
Logging Transactions
‘Circular Logging (DC A.6)’ is a strategy that leads to overwriting old data when
designated size of log is reached (IBM 2012). This approach does not support
incremental backup strategy. Transactions need to be logged with unique id and
status of their completion, indicating which functions need redoing and which need
undoing. Apply this Design Choice if storage space for logs is restricted. This
strategy provides better performance compared to archive logging.
‘Archive Logging (DC A.7)’ keeps a complete archive of all transactions (IBM
2012). Recent transactions need to be flagged as active, older transactions as
inactive. The archived logs grow over time so that external storage is needed on
constraint devices. This strategy adds functionality for retrieving the external
archive also for rollback and restore.
Design for Failure
The overall tactic can be further divided into more specific tactics that are presented
as design choices here. The first sub-tactic is ‘Acquiring more resources than
needed and replace failed ones (DC A.8)’. By applying this tactic more resources
are allocated for task execution than normally required. Besides allocating the
resources essentially necessary spare resources are reserved that could execute
the same task as the essential ones but are kept on hold. This is a precaution in
case a resource fails during runtime and a spare resource can take over the task of
the one that failed. Resource in this sense includes all computational resources,
network resources and IoT Resources, meaning all FCs in the ARM. A typical FG
that implements resource reservation is Service Organisation that is responsible for
allocating IoT Services to service requests (see Sect. 8.2.2.3). Applying this tactic
requires a higher number of resources essentially required.
Another approach is to aim at having ‘No FC or centralised FCs (DC A.9)’. The
goal is to develop designs that avoid single points of failure, like centralised FCs or
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FCs with just one instance. If a single FC fails no other instance was able to replace
its functionality. By applying this tactic more than one instance of FCs are provided
by the system so that their functionality can still be assured in case one instance
becomes unavailable. For Service Organisation FG the decentralised Service Cho-
reography FC can be preferred over Service Orchestration which requires a central
orchestration engine (see Sect. 8.2.2.3). The decentralised choreography approach
reduces the risk for a single point of failure.
To apply the design choice ‘Treat Long Latency as potential failure (DC A.10)’
the system design provides an FC that treats any long latency as a potential failure.
For instance the round-trip-time for request-response-protocols is measured and a
deadline is set as acceptable. After the deadline has passed the system treats the
behaviour as potential failure and reacts in an appropriate manner, e.g., by querying
another instance of the same FC.
Allowing Component Replication
The design choice ‘State-machine (active) replication (DC A.11)’ allows detection
of faults by replicating service requests and comparing the service results to each
other. If all results are identical no fault is assumed, if they are different it still needs
to be analysed which of the results is faulty and which is correct (Wikipedia 2013d).
To apply this technique some replication functionality needs to be implemented that
multiplies the request to different instances of FCs. To assure fault detection 2F+1
replicas of the tested FC need to be held where F is the number of faults to be
detected. The fault detection algorithm requires the tested FC to be modelled as
state-machine.
‘Transactional replication (DC A.12)’ is used in server-to-server environments
typically, in which incremental information changes need to be propagated to
subscribers in nearly real-time (Microsoft 2013).
The choice ‘Virtual synchrony (DC A.13)’ is especially suitable for systems in
which information evolves extremely rapidly. Applications are executed in process
groups and the processes within the group update each other about execution progress
by sending state updates. Implementing this technique requires functionality to join
process groups, register event handler and send multicasts to group members. Con-
sistency among information replicas can be achieved easily, thus virtual synchrony is
suitable for systems with high evolution of information (Wikipedia 2013e).
Relaxing Transactional Consistency
To follow this tactic the ‘BASE architecture (DC A.14)’ can be applied. The ‘BASE
(Basically Available, Soft-state, Eventually consistent) architecture’ is applicable
in systems supporting distributed transactions with optimistic replication strategy.
In this approach replicas of information are sent through a distributed system via
transactions and ‘eventual consistency’ among the replicas is achieved by either the
update reaches the replica or the replica retires from service (Wikipedia 2013f).
BASE requires some conflict resolution functionality and additional system
6 A Process for Generating Concrete Architectures 109
resources in order to find failure in transactions. The approach is applicable for high
performance designs.
Backup and Disaster Recovery Strategy
The following design choices should not be seen as alternative choices to apply one
tactic; the three choices are rather three controls that can help to specify a disaster
recovery plan for the system to be designed (Georgetown 2013). Therefore all three
choices can be applied alongside.
The choice ‘Preventive measures (DC A.15)’ is aimed at preventing disastrous
events, like data-loss, from occurring. To achieve this data is replicated to have
identical copies in reserve in case the original data gets lost. Consistency among the
data replicas needs to be assured by the design. To minimise risks the replicas are
better stored at different locations that the original data, preferably in the cloud.
‘Detective measures (DC A.16)’ aim at detecting or discovering unwanted
events by monitoring indicators for unwanted events, like measured values that
exceed a certain range. This strategy requires an Information Model of those
unwanted events together with their indicators that are used to detect the unwanted
event. The event detection should be operated independent of the subsystem that is
monitored to make sure the unwanted events can be detected.
The design choice ‘Corrective measures (DC A.17)’ is aimed at correcting or
restoring systems after disastrous events have occurred. Assuming the previous two
choices have been implemented, meaning the preventive methods have been
applied and the disastrous event has been detected correctly, the system can be
restored to working order again. Backups of system configurations that have
worked correctly before are restored. A configuration history (Sect. 8.2.2.8)
provides the functionality needed for restoring working configurations. The system
correction process needs to be operated independently of the system to be restored.
Some of the tactics listed in Sect. 8.3 are not considered here because they are
too specific to particular implementations:
• Select fault-tolerant hardware;
• Apply software availability solutions;
• Select or create fault-tolerant software.
6.9.8 Design Choices Conclusion
This section has presented design choices for architects who are driven by
requirements for system quality capabilities like performance and scalability, evo-
lution and interoperability, availability and resilience as well as aspects concerning
trust, security, and privacy. An architect is guided by the presented design choices in
supporting the targeted system quality attributes. In cases where the recommended
design choice is one developed during the IoT-A project a reference is given where
an architect can find more detailed information about the respective design choice.
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The design choices listed in this section are as generic as possible addressing
capabilities that are agnostic of particular functional requirements. The architect is
still left with the choice which system capabilities are the most important ones for
the system to be specified. In general trade-offs need to be made between for
instance security and performance since security always involves more data and
communication overhead that needs to be processed.
The optimal selection of design choices is dependent on the actual use case and
therefore a one-fits-all complete solution cannot be given in this section. It rather
needs to be made by architects according to their functional requirements which are
not known in the context of this document.
What this document can provide instead is an example for a concrete architec-
ture that is designed according to a sample use case. Architects shall find useful
hints for applying the ARM to concrete architectures including a selection of
appropriate design choices presents in this section. The sample concrete architec-
ture is described in Chap. 11.
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